

Smart contracts in a bare- bone UTXO model

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
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
Account-based model

- E.g. Ethereum.
- Enables a familiar programming style.
- Users can't know in which state their transaction is executed.
 - Transaction reordering attacks
 - Difficult to parallelize



UTXO model

- E.g. Bitcoin, Cardano.
- Contract state is scattered across tx outputs.
- To execute you must specify which outputs are being redeemed -> full knowledge of the state.
 - Less susceptible to reordering attacks.
 - Easily parallelizable.




Different UTXO models



The further on the left, the easier it is to implement formal verification methods

Different UTXO models




- Restricted scripting language -> limited expressiveness: contracts always terminate
- No gas mechanism

- Bitcoin-like scripting language extended with covenants.


- Scripting language is an untyped lambda calculus -> expressive contracts
- Gas mechanism.

Covenants

Covenants are a set of primitives that allow a transaction script to "look into the future" and access the output field of the redeeming transaction




Bitcoin



Bitcoin + covenants

Different UTXO models



- Restricted scripting language.
- Limited expressiveness: contracts always terminate

- Bitcoin-like scripting language extended with covenants.
- Scripting language is not Turing complete, but contracts are.
- No gas mechanism

- The scripting language is an untyped lambda calculus
- Expressive contracts (Turing complete)

Our contract language

Solidity-like imperative language that compiles to UTXO.

Compilation exploits covenants to preserve contract script.

More complex examples: AMM, ...

```
contract Auction {
  int t, m          // t: timeout, m: min bid
  address W, A      // W: winner, A: owner

  init(address owner, int timeout, int min_bid) {
    t := timeout; m := min_bid;
    A := owner; W := null
  }
  @next bid, close

  bid(int v, address X)
  @pre X!=null and v>m and v>balance(T)
  @receive v:T
  {
    if (W!=null) then pay((balance(T)-v):T -> W);
    W := X;
  }
  @next bid, close

  @after t
  @auth A
  close() {
    pay(balance(T):T -> A)
  }
}
```


Security of the compiler

Two levels of abstraction:

- **Symbolic** level: Formal contracts semantics.
- **Computational** level: UTXO blockchain with covenants.

Symbolic to computational compiler.

Computational soundness: symbolic security implies computational security.

Full paper

Secure compilation of rich smart contracts on poor UTXO blockchains:
<https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.09545>