



### Certified Byzantine Consensus with Confidential Quorum for a Bitcoin-derived Permissioned DLT

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\*The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy





Proof-of-work is **disabled** (50% success probability). Blocks are valid iff they include a **solution** to a specific block **challenge**. A challenge can be a set of 4 public keys out of which 3 signatures are required (3-of-4 OP\_CHECKMULTISIG), or a Taproot tweaked public key. A solution is the corresponding witness.





Validators jointly create blocks by adding the solution (e.g., signatures)



Who cooperate to grow a Bitcoin-like Proof-of-Authority (PoA) blockchain





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Enables the <u>reuse</u> of an existing and powerful technological stack in a permissioned setting









# System model

**Participants network** with  $\sim$ 1000s of nodes, connected in a spontaneous and not predefined topology

**Permissioned "mining" network** with  $N \in [4, \sim 20]$  nodes, geographically distributed and connected in a full-mesh topology. Mining Node = Bridge Node + Consensus Node

Up to F mining nodes **can fail arbitrarily** and N>3F

Network is weakly synchronous





## Requirements

**Correctness:** transactions should be valid and properly authorized

Safety: finality of transactions should be deterministic (no forks)

Liveness: transactions should be validated also when F nodes fail

**Calmness:** blockchain should not grow too fast

**Confidentiality** (with no faulty miners): the block solution should not reveal information to participants about the miners configuration and quorum



## Contribution: a combination of 3



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# Combining PBFT with BTC

Our replicated state machine has one operation only, i.e., "append block", and only one abstract client, i.e., the participants network, which invokes the operation every target block time. Requests can be **self-generated by replica**, avoiding trusted clients which would represent a single point of failure.





signing

start block signing

commit

commit





# Contribution: a combination of 3



# Contribution: a combination of 3



#### 3. Threshold signature scheme

Used to aggregate a quorum of signature shares and produce a single signature that is used as a block solution. FROST\* is chosen because it works with Schnorr signatures that have been recently introduced in our blockchain platform via Taproot

\*Komlo, Chelsea, and Ian Goldberg. "FROST: flexible roundoptimized Schnorr threshold signatures." *Selected Areas in Cryptography: 27th International Conference, Halifax, NS, Canada (Virtual Event), October 21-23, 2020, Revised Selected Papers 27.* Springer International Publishing, 2021.



# Combining PBFT with FROST

During the commit phase, the block is already agreed and could already be signed by replicas. Indeed, a naïve PBFT implementation based on the concatenation of signatures can mingle commit and signing: each signature can be piggybacked to the commit message, and the first node gathering a Byzantine Quorum (2F+1) of signatures can assemble and broadcast a valid block.

Nevertheless, when we move from signatures to signature shares to aggregate with FROST, an issue arises... The problem is known as **Frostland**.













# Signing blocks with FROST - 3FBFT

3FBFT: During the commit phase, each correct node creates a new signature share for all possible  $\binom{N}{k}$  combinations of k actual signers out of N possible signers and appends all the shares to the commit message. Any node receiving a Byzantine quorum of commit messages can aggregate shares and broadcast the block. Optimizes the number of rounds but has a more than exponential complexity. Suitable only in very small mining networks.



# Signing blocks with FROST - FBFT

FBFT: Appends two new rounds to PBFT, one to send the "document to sign" and one to collect signature shares from the signers. The primary aggregates shares and broadcasts the block. As demonstrated in ROAST, this terminates in a number of additional rounds that is *linear with N*, if the primary does not fail. Otherwise, timeout expires, and the view change is used to guarantee liveness.



### **Experimental results**

Geographically distributed benchmarking environment across 8 AWS European regions (Ireland, Germany, Italy, France, Sweden, England, Switzerland, Spain).

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	22.48	11.93	26.2	17.32	11.71
22.27		31.3	42.35	32.64	30.79
12.29	31.47	_	35.48	26.34	20.28
27.24	42.78	35.54		13.29	18.9
18.12	32.98	26.56	13.3		10.31
12.53	31.27	20.66	18.9	10.69	

According to <u>https://www.cloudping.co/grid</u> inter-region latency in those European regions averaged between 10ms and 50ms in the last year.

# Experimental results, signature size and latency

The first results compare the block solution size and the latency of FBFT against PBFT (baseline) and 3FBFT, in absence of load



# Experimental results, signature size and latency

When signature aggregation is not used, the block solution size grows linearly with the number of nodes. With FROST, the signature solution size is constant.



# Experimental results, signature size and latency

3FBFT has performances that are comparable with PBFT for small mining networks, but the latency sharply increase when the number of nodes grows. FBFT has just a reasonable increment in consensus latency with respect to PBFT.



## Experimental results, throughput



## Experimental results, impact of transactional load



### Experimental results, protocol dominance w/ load



### Experimental results, impact of failures (worst case)



## Conclusions

- We presented a PoA Bitcoin-derived permissioned DLT, in which blocks are signed by a federation of independent actors and transactions enjoy deterministic finality;
- Using PBFT, the federation can operate also in presence of Byzantine failures of a subset of its members, providing high availability and fault tolerance;
- Using FROST, the signatures of the federation members are aggregated, improving the block space usage efficiency and preserving the confidentiality of the mining network configuration and its quorums;
- We evaluated our algorithm in a geographically distributed environment, showing that FBFT can satisfy all our requirements for just a reasonable increment in consensus latency;
- In the future, we plan to evolve our architecture towards different research directions: dynamic federations, fairness, privacy and scalability

### Everything is open source!



https://bancaditalia.github.io/itcoin

Thanks for your attentíon!